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a b s t r a c t 
We show, for a sample of up to 757 industrial ﬁrms, in seven Latin American countries 
from 1994–2014, that these ﬁrms exhibit comparatively ﬂexible payout behavior. Flexibility 
is deﬁned in respect to (i) variability in ﬁrm payout status and amounts and (ii) parameters 
of the Lambrecht-Myers (2012) theory on the Lintner (1956) dividend equation. The results 
indicate that Latin American ﬁrms have higher speeds of adjustment and target payout 
ratios as well as lower rates of habit formation than found in the payout policies of United 
States ﬁrms. This note, thus, highlights an open question regarding conspicuously ﬂexible 
payout policies in Latin American ﬁrms. 












 1. Introduction 
Cash dividends represent circa 34% of earnings globally ( Faccio et al., 2001 ) and recent studies have shown a substantial
variation of dividend ratios internationally, both among developed ( Denis and Osobov, 2008 ) and emerging markets ( Goyal
and Muckley, 2013; Mitton, 2004 ). There is, nevertheless, a relative dearth of research concerning payout policies in emerg-
ing markets such as those in Latin America. 1 An exception is that of Benavides et al. (2016) , who show that Latin American
ﬁrms’ smooth dividends more in relatively well governed countries in the region, and that these ﬁrms show evidence of
adhering to the pecking order and trade-off theories. Also, Boulton et al. (2012) indicate a catering explanation for Brazilian
ﬁrm preferences to pay cash dividends rather than interest on equity, despite tax incentives to the contrary. In this paper,
we establish the comparative ﬂexibility of payout policies in Latin America, and in so doing highlight an intriguing open
question in the dividend policy literature. 
We report, year-by-year, from 1994 to 2014, the proportion of ﬁrms in Latin America which initiate (omit), markedly in-
crease (decrease) their cash dividend payouts as well as the proportion of payers which pay in consecutive years or exhibits
a stable dividend policy. The results suggest that Latin American ﬁrms show marked ﬂexibility in their dividend policies. For
instance, 8% of Latin American ﬁrms omit dividend payments each year on average. In contrast, in the United States only∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: J.H.von.Eije@rug.nl (H. von Eije), agoyal@liv.ac.uk (A. Goyal), cal.muckley@ucd.ie (C.B. Muckley). 
1 Some studies, however, do include Latin American countries, but do not exclusively focus on them. LaPorta et al. (20 0 0) examine agency “outcome”
and “substitution” models of cash dividends in Argentina and Mexico in 1994. Chay and Suh (2009) consider the cross-sectional determination of payout 
policies, in particular the importance of cash ﬂow uncertainty, with regard to small samples of ﬁrms in Argentina, Brazil and Chile. 
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 about 1% of ﬁrms omit each year ( Skinner, 2008 ), while in international data Twu (2010) reports a ﬁgure of approximately
4.5%. Moreover, more than 26% of Latin American ﬁrms increase their dividends by at least 30% each year while nearly 20%
reduce dividends by this amount. These are far larger ﬁgures than reported, for instance in, Denis and Osobov (2008) and
Skinner (2008) who show remarkable stability in dividend payments internationally. 
We also investigate the question of cash dividend ﬂexibility using the Lambrecht-Myers (2012) theory in relation to the
well-known Lintner model (1956) . We use Arellano-Bover (1995) and Blundell-Bond (1998) dynamic panel regressions to
show that the speed of adjustment and target payout ratios are substantively higher in Latin American ﬁrms than in ﬁrms
based in the United States. Moreover, rates of habit formation are shown to be much lower in Latin America. This distinction
can arise due to the relative ﬁnancial immaturity of Latin American ﬁrms, and, thus, the importance of signaling ( La porta
et al. 20 0 0 ) as opposed to agency costs ( Lambrecht and Myers, 2012 ) in determining their payout policies. Although, we
do not test this latter conjecture. Taking these ﬁndings together, we report compelling evidence that Latin American ﬁrms
show remarkable (and unexplained) ﬂexibility in their dividend policies. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 , we describe the measurement of the broad concept of
corporate payout ﬂexibility. In Section 3 , we report our sample and variables. In Section 4 , we present the empirical ﬁndings.
Section 5 concludes. 
2. Payout policy ﬂexibility and hypotheses development 
To quantify the concept of payout ﬂexibility we, initially, study the proportion of ﬁrms in Latin America which initiate
(omit), markedly increase (decrease) their cash dividend payouts as well as the proportion of payers which pay in consecu-
tive years and the proportion with a stable dividend policy. 
Then, we turn to the Lintner equation (1956) 
DI V t = α0 + α1 . N I t + α2 . DI V t −1 + ε t (1) 
where DIV t is the level of cash dividends at time t, NI t is the net income at time t, and εt is the error term. Due to the
lagged dividend variable, we avoid a Nickell (1981) bias, and estimate the coeﬃcients with Arellano-Bover (1995) Blundell-
Bond (1998) dynamic panel speciﬁcation. α1 is the sensitivity to earnings and (1 − α2 ) is the speed of adjustment (SOA).
The target payout ratio (TPOR) is α2 /(1 − α1 ). 
Lambrecht and Myers (2012) show that α2 depends on β (the market discount factor = 1/(1 + r), where r is the risk free
rate) and on habit formation, h, by the managers: α2 =β ∗ h. Thus, habit formation is deﬁned 
h = ( 1 + r ) ∗ α2 (2) 
Lambrecht and Myers (2012 , Eq. 47) elaborate to show that habit formation can also be calculated, if managers have a
negative exponential utility function, as γ 1 in this ﬁrst differences in dividends equation: 
DI V t = γ0 + γ1 . DI V t −1 + ϕ t (3) 
The combination of the Lintner Eq. (1) and the habit formation Eqs. (2) and ( 3 ) facilitates our formal analyses of the
distinctiveness of Latin American ﬁrms’ dividend payout policies. A higher ﬂexibility in Latin American payout policies is
consistent with relatively fast SOAs and low habit formations. Finally, relatively high TPORs in Latin America may indicate
the importance of cash dividend signaling in the region. 
3. Data and variable construction 
We test our ﬂexibility related hypotheses with ﬁrm-speciﬁc data on 757 listed ﬁrms (up to 7876 ﬁrm-years) on exchanges
(and headquartered) in seven Latin American countries (1994–2014). 2 Speciﬁcally, the annual ﬁrm-speciﬁc Latin American
data is sourced in Worldscope on the following countries viz. Argentina (Buenos Aires SE – 72 ﬁrms), Brazil (BM&F Bovespa
– 257 ﬁrms), Chile (Santiago SE – 142 ﬁrms), Colombia (Bolsa de Valores de Colombia – 41 ﬁrms), Mexico (Bolsa Mexicana
de Valores – 121 ﬁrms), Peru (Bolsa de Valores de Lima – 103 ﬁrms), Venezuela (Bolsa de Valores de Caracas – 21 ﬁrms)),
and the USA (NYSE and NASDAQ, 3190 ﬁrms). The Latin America exchanges are selected as they have a minimum market
capitalization of US$ 25 Billion for each sample year studied (World Federation of Exchanges). 
In line with the corporate payout determination literature ( e.g. Fama and French, 2001 ; Denis and Osobov, 2008 ; Skinner
2008 ), our sample excludes foreign ﬁrms, ADRs, ﬁrms with negative dividends or market-to-book ratios, and ﬁrms which
operate in the ﬁnancial services (SIC codes 60 0 0–6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4 900–4 94 9) sectors. We search the World-
scope database for active as well as dead and suspended listings in order to avoid survivor bias, and select companies with
usable ISIN and SIC industry codes. We eliminate companies with similar ISIN codes and similar names, and companies that
give error codes in downloading data. Finally, we adopt the country speciﬁc CPIs to convert the nominal ﬁrm speciﬁc ac-
counting and ﬁnancial data into real 1994 prices and then convert it to a common U.S. dollar numeraire using the year-end
country-speciﬁc exchange rate. Winsorization is undertaken at the upper and lower 1% level. 2 The sample commences in 1994 as there is limited coverage of ﬁrms headquartered outside the U.S. prior to this date ( Denis and Osobov, 2008 ) as 
well as limited capital market liberalization before 1990 ( Bekaert and Harvey, 1995 ). 
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Table 1 
Table presents the proportions of ﬁrms in Latin America which disclose their payout policies from 1994 
to 2014. Payer is the proportion of ﬁrms paying dividend in the current year. Prior Pay is ﬁrms which 
pay dividends over two consecutive years. Initiate (Omit) are the ﬁrms that did not pay anything last 
(current) year, but paid cash dividend in the current (last) year. Inc. by 30% (Dec. by 30%) are ﬁrms that 
increased (decreased) their dividend payout in the current year by more than 30% compared to last year. 
Stable Payers are ﬁrms whose payout in current year is within + / − 30% of last year. 
Year Payer Prior Pay Initiate Omit Inc. by 30% Dec. by 30% Stable Payers 
1994 76 .652 
1995 71 .484 78 .027 13 .672 11 .454 26 .457 24 .215 49 .327 
1996 69 .310 71 .542 11 .724 6 .250 32 .411 17 .787 49 .802 
1997 69 .745 69 .097 10 .828 5 .517 30 .208 18 .750 51 .042 
1998 68 .254 69 .836 16 .667 7 .643 25 .246 22 .951 51 .803 
1999 58 .600 68 .785 18 .0 0 0 14 .550 15 .470 30 .939 53 .591 
20 0 0 58 .473 58 .932 11 .359 8 .0 0 0 24 .230 18 .275 57 .495 
2001 56 .473 57 .965 6 .379 8 .752 21 .497 17 .658 60 .845 
2002 55 .028 57 .143 6 .262 8 .255 17 .761 26 .448 55 .792 
2003 58 .550 55 .319 8 .550 3 .985 33 .269 10 .832 55 .899 
2004 59 .425 58 .667 8 .977 6 .320 33 .524 12 .952 53 .524 
2005 60 .708 59 .963 9 .612 5 .027 32 .775 11 .732 55 .493 
2006 63 .158 60 .174 7 .470 5 .396 26 .783 13 .913 59 .304 
2007 65 .422 63 .763 9 .740 4 .924 35 .366 13 .937 50 .697 
2008 66 .281 65 .488 7 .438 7 .630 24 .411 22 .222 53 .367 
2009 60 .984 66 .496 6 .393 11 .240 27 .009 25 .641 47 .350 
2010 65 .154 61 .008 11 .345 6 .557 36 .807 15 .798 47 .395 
2011 67 .657 65 .552 7 .096 5 .673 30 .602 15 .217 54 .181 
2012 66 .156 68 .096 5 .442 8 .746 20 .240 23 .156 56 .604 
2013 67 .254 66 .667 6 .514 7 .483 22 .695 22 .340 54 .965 
2014 64 .286 67 .904 4 .329 18 .486 19 .214 24 .454 56 .332 




















 4. Empirical results 
Table 1 presents the proportion (percentage) of ﬁrms, year-by-year from 1994 to 2014, in our seven Latin American
markets, which conduct reported cash dividend payouts. 3 The panel also shows the proportions of these ﬁrms which are
prior payers ( i.e. pay dividend over two consecutive ﬁscal years), which conduct cash dividend initiations and abandonments,
which either increase or decrease the cash dividend payout by more than 30% compared to the previous year’s cash dividend
payout ( Chemmanur et al., 2010 ), and which are stable payers i.e. neither initiate nor abandon or substantially increase /
decrease their dividend payout amount from the previous ﬁscal year. 
In comparison with ﬁrms in the United States ( Skinner, 2008 ) and in international markets ( Twu, 2010 ), we ﬁnd, on
average, a markedly higher proportion of ﬁrms either abandoning (8%) or decreasing (19%) their payout amount by more
than 30% from last ﬁscal year in Latin America. We also observe that initiators (almost 9%) and marked dividend increasers
(27%) are also prevalent in Latin America. In contrast, Skinner (2008) shows that in the United States the proportion of ﬁrms
increasing dividends (by any amount) ranges from 17.9% to 11.2% in recent decades. The corresponding proportion of ﬁrms
reducing dividend is at about the 1% level (also see Chemmanur et al., 2010 ). Moreover, while the proportion of prior payers
who pay is reported internationally as above 95% in Twu (2010) , it is on average about 63% in Latin America. Hence, this
constitutes intriguing evidence of a distinctively high ﬂexibility in payout statuses and amounts in Latin America. 
Turning to Table 2 , we report ﬁndings in respect to the Lambrecht-Myers theory which can inform interpretation of the
Lintner (1956) equation. In line with our dividend ﬂexibility hypothesis, we ﬁnd that the speed of adjustment and the target
payout ratios are substantively higher in Latin America than in the USA. Further, habit formation is substantively lower in
Latin America, once outliers are removed at the 5% and 95% levels. 4 
We conjecture that the higher target payout ratios reported in Latin America vis-à-vis North America can stem from the
greater importance of signaling to the higher target payout ratio ﬁrms. Our main conclusion is that the higher target payout
ratios and speed of adjustment, and lower habit formation rates in Latin America, show the relative ﬂexibility of payout
policy in Latin America. We leave to future work the identiﬁcation of an explanation for this result. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have examined the relative ﬂexibility of corporate payout policies of ﬁrms listed in seven Latin American
countries. Our initial motivation to study the Latin American region is as a result of distinctive dividend ratios in emerg-3 For summary statistics on the variables we study see Appendix A1 . 
4 It is remarkable that habit formation, using Eq. 3 , gives in general a negative rate for both mature and immature ﬁrms in LA and in the USA, unless 
outliers at the 5% level are removed. 
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Table 2 
Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator results with robust standard errors 
The dependent variable of the regressions is the amount of dividend paid (DIV). 
LDIV is the lagged value of the amount of dividend paid, NI is net income. P -values 
are presented below the coeﬃcients within parentheses. SOA is the speed of ad- 
justment and it is calculated as 1 minus the coeﬃcient of LDIV. TPOR is the tar- 
get payout ratio, calculated as the coeﬃcient of NI divided by the SOA. HF is the 
habit formation calculated from the change in dividends (for trimmed observations) 
based on Myers and Lambrecht (2012 , Eq. 47). 
Variables USA ﬁrms Latin American ﬁrms 
NI 0 .124 0 .279 
(0 .001) (0 .007) 
LDIV 0 .487 0 .351 
(0 .002) (0 .0 0 0) 
Constant 99 .843 9 .211 
(0 .0 0 0) (0 .196) 
Observations 12 ,466 2991 
Number of ﬁrms 1208 417 
SOA 0 .513 0 .649 
TPOR 0 .242 0 .430 
HF from Eq. 2 a 0 .489 0 .404 
HF from Eq. 3 −0 .286 −0 .250 
(0 0 0 0) (0 .001) 
HF from Eq. 3 b 0 .304 −0 .085 
(0 .0 0 0) (0 .068) 
a Using a risk free interest rate of 0.5% for the USA and 15% for Latin America. 







 ing markets ( Denis and Osobov, 2008 ; Goyal and Muckley, 2013 ) and the relative riskiness of economic growth variation
exhibited by these markets. 
Our ﬁndings suggest that there is a substantive payout policy ﬂexibility in Latin America. Using the Lambrecht-Myers
(2012) theoretical insight into the Lintner (1956) equations, we show that the speed of adjustment and target payout ratios
are, indeed, much higher in Latin America than in North America. Moreover, the rate of habit formation, of ﬁrm managers in
respect to payout policy decisions, is markedly low. We suggest that Latin American ﬁrms may exhibit greater information
asymmetries (due to a ﬁnancial immaturity) which can be somewhat offset by high dividend ratios. We leave to future
work, however, the provision of an explanation for the relative ﬂexibility of Latin American pay outs. 
Appendix A1. Deﬁnition of the variables used in this study and their mean and median values for all the ﬁrms, and 
cash dividend payers and non-payers for seven Lain America countries, from 1994–2014 
Mean Median 
Variable acronym Variable deﬁnitions All ﬁrms Payers Non-payers All ﬁrms Payers Non-payers 
DIV Total annual common cash 
dividend paid in million US$, 
1994 prices. 
44 .739 70 .534 0 .0 0 0 1 .730 9 .470 0 .0 0 0 
Net_Inc Net annual income in million US$, 
1994 prices. 
92 .952 144 .204 3 .223 9 .140 20 .800 0 .220 
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